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Abstract
Poor corporate governance practices have been cited as contributory to the 2007
global financial crisis. The chapter explores a qualitative self-regulation approach to
address a major risk facing banks using the Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion (BCBS) framework of internal controls. The study examines the effect of the
qualitative principles of the BCBS internal control framework on credit risk. Cor-
porate institutions use internal control frameworks to address the most operational
risks, but the current study hypothesizes a possible relation with the credit risk.
This research covers banks from selected EU countries covering some period before
and after the 2007 financial crisis using a fixed-effect model. We report a significant
relationship between board functions and activities, board structure and board
monitoring, and credit risk. The results indicate that investment in high-risk assets,
bank profitability and board chair being ex-CEO increases credit risk in European
banking. The chapter extends the scope of a previous work that used the elements
of the COSO internal control framework on a single country. This quantitative
measure of qualitative constructs of the framework complements existing research
that uses algorithms and simulations to study credit risk.
Keywords: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Framework,
Board of Directors, credit risk, European banking, internal controls
1. Introduction
The aftermath of the 2007 global financial crisis led to the tightening of corpo-
rate governance practices among financial institutions. As the apex of the internal
governance system, board of directors have a duty in ensuring adherence and
compliance with sound banking practices. The internal control framework of the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) reiterates the role of board of
directors and senior management in ensuring that there is efficiency, compliance
and standard reporting of banking activities. Prior to the 2007 global financial crisis,
the BCBS had reported the importance of bank internal controls. The breakdown of
internal control systems is attributable to weak management oversight, account-
ability and control culture, inadequate risk assessment of banking activities, failure
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of control structures and activities, ineffective share and flow of internal
information and ineffective internal audit and monitoring activities [1].
Some researchers argue that poor risk management practices and weak corpo-
rate governance systems partially or significantly account for the 2007 global
financial crisis [2, 3]. The crisis led to high rates of non-performing loans which
affected several economies in the US and Europe. In a briefing to the European
Parliament, the authors lament the rate of non-performing loans leading to credit
risk among EU countries during and after the global financial crisis [4]. Prior
research identifies factors such as low profitability, bank size and high concentra-
tion of banks in lending as key determinants of credit risk in the banking industry
[5]. This study explores qualitative self-regulation approach using the BCBS internal
control framework to investigate how internal controls affect credit risk in Euro-
pean banking. This chapter extends prior research about the banking industry in
Spain where the authors find significant relation between the elements of internal
controls using the COSO framework [6]. The study differs from existing ones in
several ways. Whilst previous study focuses on a single country, the current chapter
covers several countries within the EU thus making it broader and wider. The work
of Akwaa-Sekyi and Moreno [6] uses single variables to measure the elements of
internal controls but the current study uses several variables which cover the prin-
ciples of internal controls. Unlike the previous study which uses the COSO frame-
work, this chapter uses bank-related framework suggested by the BCBS. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first chapter to use the BCBS internal control frame-
work to study its relationship with credit risk within the European banking.
This chapter derives motivations from three sources. The first motivation for
this study comes from Cho and Chung [7]. They find that banks with weak internal
control weakness report high provision for loan losses and loan loss reserves which
exacerbates credit risk. Anytime banks intensify efforts to strengthen internal con-
trol weaknesses, there were reductions in provisions and loan loss reserves [7].
Based on their findings, we propose the use of the BCBS internal control framework
to minimize bank credit risk. Second, prior research by Uhde et al. [8] motivates
this chapter. In reviewing existing literature Uhde et al. [8] underscore the rele-
vance of a framework that combines board structure and composition to ensure
effective board monitoring. We concur with this integrated framework approach
and therefore propose the joint effect of board functions and activities, board
structure and board monitoring to minimize bank credit risk. Finally, the work of
Karkowska and Acedański [9] motivates this chapter. The authors conclude that
there is no much change in the corporate governance and bank stability nexus after
the financial crisis and therefore suggest the need to strengthen corporate gover-
nance practices. This implies there is still room for banks to improve upon their
corporate governance practices to deepen and sustain investor confidence in the
banking system. For this reason, we suggest an internal control framework that is
quite exhaustive in addressing the menace of investor losses such as credit risk.
Failures to detect breakdowns in internal controls lead to massive fraud which puts
shareholder investment in jeopardy and lack of confidence in the banking sector.
The chapter seeks to fill these research gaps by analyzing how internal governance
of the BCBS framework of internal controls affects credit risk.
The contributions of this chapter are not far-fetched. First, this chapter extends
the literature on the relationship between board functions and activities and bank
credit risk. The findings suggest that effective board functions and activities mini-
mize bank credit risk. Second, this study proffers evidence to support the agency
and institutional theories to monitor managerial behavior likely to result in invest-
ment losses through credit risk. The result complements existing research that
independent board structure minimizes credit risk. Another contribution of this
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chapter to the agency theory is how board chair being ex-CEO increases bank risks.
Prior research [10–12] uses CEO duality which is defined as situations where
existing CEOs double as board chair. Our study uses current chair being ex-CEO to
determine the effect of previous position (ex-CEO) in influencing board functions.
We find that board chair being ex-CEO increases bank credit risk which is contrary
to the views of John et al. [12] that CEO duality increases corporate governance.
One other strength of this chapter is its complementarity to existing and widely
used quantitative approaches to managing credit risk. The chapter encourages the
use of internal governance mechanisms to address a major problem in banking. The
rest of the sections cover hypotheses development, methodology, results and dis-
cussion, and conclusion.
1.1 Basel Committee of Banking Supervision framework for internal control
systems
Following significant losses in banking organizations, the concerns to minimize
such occurrences triggered the coming together of experts from various countries to
develop a framework that will guide the conduct of banking business. The motiva-
tion behind the development of the framework for internal control systems is to
address and enhance supervisory issues that encourage sound risk management
practices [1]. The confidence in an effective and functioning control system is its
ability to prevent and enable earlier detection of catastrophic but avoidable poten-
tial losses. Thus the framework is meant for member countries worldwide to use in
evaluating internal control systems among banks albeit the situational circum-
stances pertaining to different countries. The Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision which is a subcommittee of the risk management committee of the Bank for
International Settlements outline 13 principles for assessing internal control systems
captioned under five main areas or elements. The broad areas include management
oversight and the control culture, risk recognition and assessment, control activities
and segregation of duties, information and communication and monitoring
activities.
1.2 Thirteen principles of the BCBS internal control framework
• The role of board of directors includes reviewing policies, have understanding
and ability to manage risks and ensure that senior management complies. The
board has a duty to ensure the establishment and maintenance of internal
control systems.
• Senior management has a duty to ensure the implementation of board
developed policies, develop processes for identifying, measuring, monitoring
and controlling risks and internal control systems through delegation and
segregation of duties.
• Board of directors and senior management must exemplify a culture of ethical
behavior and integrity and respect for internal controls by full engagement
• Regular, effective and continuous assessment of all material risk exposures of
the bank
• Appropriate control structure at all business levels, ensuring enforcement of
compliance and approval limits, reconciliation and verification systems,
physical controls
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• Ensure segregation of duties and elimination of potential conflict of interest in
the conduct of business
• Detailed and comprehensive internal financial, operational and compliance
data, external market information (events and conditions) which is reliable,
timely and easily accessible in a consistent and user-friendly format
• Reliable and secured information systems independently monitored and
supported by adequate contingency arrangements
• Effective flow and share of information across personnel in functional areas
and departments and units
• Periodic ongoing and daily monitoring of key risks by internal audit and
business lines
• Independent and competent internal audit ensuring adherence to internal
control systems and reporting to senior management and board of directors
• Reporting material internal control weakness to senior management and board
• Supervisors should ensure that all banks irrespective of size have effective
internal controls that are consistent with the complexity and risks of business
The reasons behind the enforcement of these principles are to ensure that inter-
nal control systems achieve performance, information and compliance objectives
[1]. The Basel framework is a risk-based approach which grants some independence
to banks to manage their own risks and to ensure safe and sound bank practices
through effective balancing of supervisory and principle-based regulatory
approaches [13]. Well-functioning internal controls serve as bedrock for capital
adequacy under prudential risk management regulation.
To ensure sound governance and protection shareholder and other stakeholder
interests, board of directors exercise oversight responsibilities over senior
management. Board of directors owe it a duty to ensure a culture of control,
adherence to principles and statutes exist to put management in check. This
function has been given alternative names such as “tone at the top” by researchers.
The International Federation of Accountants [14] emphasizes the tone at the top
and culture and ethical framework as vital to the implementation of internal
controls. The federation attributes serious accounting scandals to a situation of poor
tone on the part of top management. Hansen et al. [15] and Hermanson et al. [16]
report that the tone at the top should be assessed and reported periodically to ensure
that management and upper management continuously conform to systems put in
place. They admit the importance of the tone at the top and culture of control as
very key to ensuring effective internal controls among public and non-public
organizations. The board must be seen to be doing more than just enough to ensure
good tone and corporate culture that minimizes risk [17]. Financial organizations
must pursue a risk culture that seeks to improve oversight structures and risk
metrics and good compliance [18]. Effective implementation of board policies
sustains and fuels management oversight and control culture. Schwartz [19]
identifies board policies among other dimensions of effective corporate culture.
Management oversight and control culture covers the roles and responsibilities of
board of directors, executive management and the maintenance of high honesty and
ethical culture.
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Risk recognition and assessment involves the determination, identification and
evaluation of risks or unfavorable events likely to impede the achievement of
organizational objectives. Under risk management, companies should specify suit-
able objectives, identify and analyze risks, assess fraud risk and identify and analyze
significant change. The expertise and experience of management and board mem-
bers and their ability to identify, measure, monitor and evaluate risks goes a long
way to reduce the consequences of bank risks. These functions means ensuring
acceptable rates of risk weighted asset density [20], diversification and enforce-
ment of internal controls to address operational risks.
The BCBS framework emphasizes the use of relevant information and commu-
nication to internal (functional areas and employees) and external users (stake-
holders) through various reports (Abbas and Iqbal [21]). Banks earn reputational
capital by providing reliable timely information to internal and external stake-
holders [22]. Information flow, information sharing and representation on various
committees within banks improves upon the risk culture [18] and transparency.
Board meetings and committee functions helps information production. The control
activities comprise selecting and developing control activities in general and over
technology and deploying policies and procedures. It concerns taking precautionary
measures and determining acceptable risk tolerance levels through policies, checks,
and balances [21]. Bank control activities were found to significantly minimize
credit risk [6]. Monitoring is about conducting on-going and/or separate evalua-
tions and evaluating and communicating deficiencies [23]. The use of internal and
external audit units, enforcement of internal control policies and adherence to
regulatory measures improve bank monitoring. The agency problem can be linked
to major banking activities which increases the probability risk exposure. Bank
complexity and opacity (especially in the credit creation function) have the ten-
dency to exacerbate the agency problem [24]. Bank managers in their effort to
originate, fund, service and monitor credit supply may engage in certain actions or
inactions that will impair the loan portfolio leading to the loss of assets. It is to avert
such occurrences that effective internal control systems that minimizes such losses
should be in place and effectively enforced.
1.3 Credit risk
Credit risk is crucial for bank management because of its relationship with other
risks such as operational, market, and liquidity risks. Players in the financial ser-
vices industry especially large-sized institutions use unproven and untested credit
risk models and this could be cited as one of the causes of the 2007 financial crisis
[3]. A publication on the role of credit risk in bank management and corporate
governance, Lang and Jagtiani [3] argue that over-reliance on advanced quantitative
credit risk models did not prove successful during the mortgage crisis. Thus, a
multi-approach that adopts qualitative approaches to complement prudential quan-
titative models will enhance bank risk management. The chapter proposes this
multi-approach by employing the BCBS framework for internal controls to address
bank credit risk. Credit risk is a destination point for loan default and non-
performing loans. Series of loan defaults transform into non-performing portfolio
before it gets to the stage of credit risk. Figure 1 shows the credit risk trajectory.
In this trajectory (Figure 1), unpaid loans transform into default, then
prolonged default graduates into non-performing loans which leads to credit risk
and eventually the effect on related market participants could lead to financial
crisis. The final destination of this trajectory is financial crisis, which affects the
wider industry players because of the interconnectedness of the banking model. In
the event of increasing default, there is increase in portfolio credit risk [25]. Bank
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credit risk management strategies should therefore be comprehensive to address
issues of default and prevent increasing non-performing loans. Most literature on
credit risk uses ratios such as non-performing loans to total loans, provision for loan
losses and loan loss reserves [5, 6, 26] to measure credit risk.
2. Hypotheses development
In spite of the distinctive nature of the principles of internal controls according
to the BCBS framework, they overlap and reinforce each other. For this reason, the
author proposes three broad thematic areas which comprise board activities and
functions, board structure and board monitoring.
2.1 Board functions and activities
The functions and activities of board of directors affect their supervisory and
fiduciary role in protecting the interest of shareholders. The activities and functions
of the board of directors affect managerial behavior. From the institutional theory,
Zucker [27] explains that it is a complex view of the organization and how it
responds to normative pressures from the internal and external environment that
compels the organization to take legitimate stance to respond to such pressures.
Institutional theories emphasize standard systems and procedures for the conduct
of business to ensure survival of the organization. Scott [28] outlined three factors
of institutionalization which comprises cognitive elements (systems and cultural
foundations of society), normative elements (expectation from acceptable
behavior) and enforcement processes (assessment, surveillance and sanctioning).
Relating this theory to the BCBS internal controls framework, it implies drafting,
implementing and improving policies that lead to acceptable behavior. It connotes a
policy of creating, exemplifying and sustaining a culture of ethical behavior and
compliance. The BCBS framework emphasizes enforcing sound internal control
measures and this is a function of the expertise of the audit committee. The
expertise of the board provides assurance for quality and efficiency in discharging
board functions [29]. Board of directors carry out their activities by attending
meetings and participating in committee tasks. The activities of board members are
also about the number of meetings held within the financial year. We expect audit
committee expertise, board policy functions and number of board meetings to
significantly reduce credit risk. We therefore hypothesize that:
H1: Board functions and activities minimize credit risk.
2.2 Board structure
The structure of a board determines their effectiveness and efficiency with
which they carry out their activities. Different studies use different variables to
measure board structure. For example, Farag and Mallin [30] models board
Figure 1.
The credit risk trajectory. Source: Author’s construct.
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structure in terms of unitary and dual boards and CEO duality and report no
significant relation with bank fragility. Studying the UK financial sector, Akbar
et al. [10] use board size, board independence and combined role of CEO and board
chair as variables for board structure. The results from the UK study show that there
is little evidence of CEO duality. The regression results confirm low risk taking
behavior. Other authors use board size, board independence and board member
affiliations as proxy for board structure [9]. The authors report that independent
board structure reduces bank risks. The inconclusiveness in the findings stimulates
further investigation into board structure. The structure of board of directors
should ensure minimizing the agency problem through segregation of duties (as
enshrined in the BCBS internal control framework). The structure, composition and
characteristics of board of directors could be relevant in their oversight and control
functions [31]. Board characteristics such as board composition, independence, size,
and gender diversity are efficient in monitoring and control of management [32].
The authors explain that these board characteristics motivate board members in the
quest to control and maintain a risk culture and sound bank management to the
satisfaction of stakeholders. The current study measures board structure by non-
executive board members, board diversity, and board chair being ex-CEO. We
expect that boards with non-executive members, few cases of board chair being
ex-CEO and boards with adequate female representation can demonstrate higher
degree of independence. This leads to the hypothesis that:
H2: Independent board structure reduces credit risk whilst boards with weak
independence increase credit risk.
2.3 Board monitoring and control
Board monitoring has undergone several evolutions in corporate governance
research [33]. The authors emphasize the role of the internal audit in responding to
the agency problem through effective monitoring. The agency theory provides
strong theoretical foundation to internal control research. The theory (traceable to
the late 20th century and attributable to Jensen and Meckling) provides an under-
lying explanation of internal controls with the assumption that institutional behav-
ior emanates from individual pursuit of self-interest and that there should be
separation of ownership from control in order to minimize possible conflict of
interest between the agent and the principal. The theory emphasizes separation of
ownership from control, protection of minority interests, reducing conflict of
interest and minimization of information asymmetry [34]. Jensen and Meckling
[34] explain that the firm is a nexus of contracts among individual factors of
production with conflicting objectives. Thus the best way of unifying these conflicts
of interest is the use of contracts that minimizes the agency costs and enhances
performance to maximize the value of the firm. A managerial tool put in place to
check management and employee misbehavior through auditing, budgeting, com-
pensation and other forms of control have proven successful in minimizing the
agency costs [33, 35, 36]. Some high level of transparency and reporting is manda-
tory in order to effectively deal with information asymmetry. Internal control
frameworks through the internal audit unit ensure the reporting and compliance
objectives. Board audit committees reinforce the monitoring functions by ensuring
compliance and adherence to internal controls [37]. Upadhyay et al. [37] conclude
that board monitoring committees mitigate costs. We measure board monitoring by
audit committee independence. Firms prefer using control-based approaches
through audit committees with emphasis on high risk areas [38]. We propose the
use of risk assessment and control by ensuring appropriate risk-weighted assets to
total assets ratio to check possible insolvency. The use of risk weighted density
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(ratio or risk weighted assets to total assets) has a positive relation with bank credit
risk [20]. From the discussions above, two hypotheses emerge:
H3: Higher risk weighted density increases bank credit risk.
H4: Effective board monitoring reduces bank credit risk.
2.4 Control variables
Bank management practices such as profitability motives affect the level of
credit risk. Mixed findings exist in the relationship between credit risk and bank
profitability. Studying the drivers of credit risk in the Indian banking industry, the
authors find negative relation between ROA and credit risk [5]. The authors explain
that banks engage in more prudent lending practices with improved borrower
monitoring mechanisms to minimize the level of credit risk. Their findings confirm
the work of Ghosh [39]. Others use credit risk as explanatory variable and conclude
that there is a relation between credit risk and bank profitability in the US and Asia
[26]. We argue that, the pursuit of profitability motives in the presence of weak
internal control systems exacerbate bank credit risk exposure. In the model, we use
return on assets (ROA) as proxy for profitability motives. The size of banks deter-
mines the volume of activities including loan portfolio which can determine credit
risk. The BCBS internal control framework emphasizes coordinated effort between
internal and external controls such as the regulator. Central banks use regulatory
tools such as capital adequacy ratio and bank reserves to minimize bank risks.
3. Data and methodology
The initial sample comprises listed banks of countries within the European
Union from Datastream andWorldscope databases. The websites of individuals and
central banks of respective banks and countries provide further information about
the banks under study. The period under study spans from 2004 to 2016. The
chapter seeks to cover some period prior to the crisis, during and after the crisis.
Based on data availability author analyzed the time period around the financial
crisis, therefore some years before and some years after the crisis were taken into
account. The databases compile bank-level data on corporate governance and
financial performance variables. The analyses exclude banks with less than 5 years
of data on the variables of interest. This makes the panel data unbalanced. Even
though the data shows an initial 586 bank-year observations in the descriptive
statistics, the regressions use 368 observations for the analyses.
3.1 Internal controls variables
The study classifies the 13 principles of the BCBS internal controls framework
under three headings namely board activities and functions, board structure and
board monitoring. The model is found below:
CRi,t ¼ αþ β
X3
J¼1
BodFtnsi,t þ θ
X3
J¼1
BodFtnsi,t þ δ
X2
J¼1
BodMoniti,t þ γContrþ εi,t (1)
Where CR represents credit risk, i = 1… ..56 banks, t = 2004… 2016 α is the
constant, β, θ, δ, γ are coefficients to be estimated and ε is the error term. BodFtns
represents the set of variables on board activities and functions which affect credit
risk, BodStruc represent the set of variables on board structure, BodMonit represent
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the set of variables on board monitoring activities and Contr represent the set of
control variables.
BodFtns ¼ f Audit Committee expertise,Board policy function,Number of board meetingsð Þ
(2)
BodStruc ¼ f Board diversity,Non executive members,Chairman is ex CEOð
(3)
BodMonit ¼ f Audit committee independence,Risk Weighted Assets to Total Assetsð Þ
(4)
Contr ¼ f Capital adequacy ratio Tier 1,Bank profitability,Bank sizeð Þ (5)
An extended model which comprises all the variables (including control
variables) follows:
CRi,t ¼ αþ β1Audit Committee expertisei,t þ β2Board policy functionsi,t
þ β3Number of board meetingsi,t þ θ1Board diversityi,t þ θ2Non
 executive memberi,t þ θ3Chairman is ex CEOi,t
þ δ1Audit committeee independencei,t þ δ2Risk weighted assets to total assetsi,t
þ γ1Capital adequacy ratio Tier 1i,t þ γ2BankSizei,t þ γ3Bank profitabilityi,t
þ εi,t
(6)
The chapter uses the OLS, fixed effect and random effect estimation techniques.
Sometimes, the assumptions of OLS may lead to biases and misleading standard
errors hence the use of fixed and random effect models. The fixed effect model
assumes that certain individual characteristics within may bias the model [40].
Torres-Reyna [40] explains this as the rationale behind the correlation between the
error term and predictor variables. The fixed effect model removes the effect of
time-invariant characteristics thereby perfectly estimating the true effect of the
explanatory variables. In addition to addressing possible endogeneity issues associ-
ated with panel data, we include control variables at bank and country levels to
suppress the possible effect of such characteristics. Random effect models have
superiority in higher-level estimations. In order to select whether fixed or random
effect models is suitable for estimation, we perform the Hausman test.
4. Results and discussion
The results comprise descriptive statistics, correlation matrix and regression
results for OLS, fixed effect, random effect and Hausman specification test.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics (number of observations, means, stan-
dard deviation, minimum and maximum values) for the variables. The result shows
high credit risk (mean = 0.948). Variables on board functions such as audit com-
mittee expertise (mean = 0.516) and board policy function (mean = 0.610) are
average or just above average. This is a good sign for effective internal controls. The
structure of the board shows good representation of females, more than average
non-executive members and some banks having board chair who were former
CEOs. Thus the banks have a balanced board which enables effective board activi-
ties. There is evidence of board monitoring and control as can be seen from audit
committee independence and control activities. The mean risk-weighted assets
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(RWA) to total assets is almost 50%. This is an indication of high risk and it is
therefore not surprising that credit risk is high among the banks sampled for the
study.
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix for the variables. High correlation
coefficients (for example, 0.8 and above) are indications of high collinearity and
this may cause problems in econometric estimations. The coefficients of the
independent variables show that the variables are not highly correlated among
themselves. This is an indication that the variables do not suffer multicollinearity
problems.
We estimate the first model using OLS technique. Among board function vari-
ables, a number of board meetings show very significant relation with credit risk.
Non-executive board members and chairman being ex-CEO are board structure
variables that show significant relations with credit risk. Board activities (number
of board meetings) shows significant positive relation with credit risk in the OLS
model but the sign changes in the panel data analysis. Overall explanatory power of
the OLS model is 26% which is far higher than those of fixed and random effects.
Perhaps, this account for some of the biases of using OLS models instead of fixed
and random effect models because OLS assumes that all the observations in the
dataset are conditionally independent. This brings about bias and misleading stan-
dard errors. The study addresses bank heterogeneity using fixed and random effect
models in a model that encompasses individual and time-specific effects. Based on
the assumption that individual bank error term correlates with the predictor vari-
ables, we employ fixed effects model to cater for time-invariant omitted variables.
The difficulty in choosing fixed or random effect models is addressed by
performing Hausman specification test. The significant variables for both fixed and
random effect models are almost the same and consistent. The directions of associ-
ation of the significant variables are the same. The use of Hausman specification test
faces some criticisms. For example, when the between effect R2 is larger than the
within effect R2, it is not appropriate to employ the fixed effect estimation tech-
nique even when Hausman test recommend the fixed effect model. The current
study does not suffer such complications. In spite of the criticisms against the
Hausman test, it is still widely used and accepted in research. The result from the
Hausman test found in Table 3 recommend the use of fixed effect model because
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Net loans total loans 586 0.948 0.147 0 1.892
Audit committee independence 503 75.827 28.665 0 100
Audit committee expertise 586 51.62 30.667 3.46 89.04
Board policy functions 586 61.041 23.166 0.4 77.78
Board diversity 563 60.202 28.377 11.81 100
Non-executive members 532 66.63 19.392 3.99 100
Capital adequacy ratio-Tier 1 555 10.725 3.458 7.3 26.9
Chairman is ex-CEO 586 0.169 0.375 0 1
Number of board meetings 486 13.403 7.603 0 68
RWA to total assets 586 0.483 0.395 0 4.932
ROA 539 0.836 1.245 12.42 4.99
Bank size 586 19.44 1.479 16.624 22.579
Table 1.
Descriptive statistics.
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Variables Net loans to
total loans
Board policy
function
Number of board
meetings
RWA to
total assets
Audit
comm
indep
Audit comm
expertis
Non-exec.
Board
Board
diversity
Chairman is
ex-CEO
CAR-
Tier 1
ROA Bank
size
Net loans to
total loans
1.000
Board policy
function
0.054 1.000
Numb of board
meetings
0.159*** 0.034 1.000
RWA/Total
Assets
0.176*** 0.203*** 0.054 1.000
Audit com
independence
0.208*** 0.223*** 0.086 0.175*** 1.000
Audit com
expertise
0.041 0.133*** 0.039 0.089** 0.090** 1.000
Non-exec board 0.128*** 0.043 0.037 0.003 0.061 0.036 1.000
Board diversity 0.039 0.198*** 0.058 0.217*** 0.158*** 0.185*** 0.106** 1.000
Chairman is ex-
CEO
0.064 0.060 0.062 0.042 0.036 0.042 0.021 0.095** 1.000
Capital
adequacy ratio 1
0.003 0.032 0.033 0.187*** 0.169*** 0.239*** 0.010 0.250*** 0.179*** 1.000
ROA 0.161*** 0.160*** 0.190*** 0.081* 0.083* 0.041 0.064 0.048 0.039 0.132*** 1.000
Bank size 0.052 0.214*** 0.175*** 0.319*** 0.252*** 0.221*** 0.054 0.567*** 0.157*** 0.184*** 0.027 1.000
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
Table 2.
Correlation matrix.
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the probability Chi2 value is significant (p < 0.05). Table 3 shows the results for
Hausman test to choose whether fixed effects or random effects model is
appropriate for estimation. When the p-value is significant (95% confidence
interval), we reject the null hypothesis that random effect model is preferable. The
result for the test shows high significance at 99% confidence interval. This implies
the use of the fixed effect model for econometric estimation.
Apart from audit committee independence and board diversity, all the variables
in model show some level of significance within 90–99% confidence interval. From
Table 4, all the variables for board function show significant relation for the fixed
and random effect models. This is unlike the OLS model which show significance
for only number of board meetings. The fixed effect model caters for individual
bank level biases that may influence credit risk. Even though all the countries are
found within the European Union and may have some standardizations, there are
still bank and country-specific factors which account for differences. This is why we
assume that bank error terms do not correlate with the constant [40] thereby
justifying the choice of fixed effects. The R2 results for within the entities are 41%
for the fixed effect model. This indicates higher within entity variations. It is
interesting to find that the R2 values for the fixed and random effect models are not
different.
The expertise of the audit committee is within average which is a sign for good
board function. However, this is unable to translate into credit risk mitigation.
Contrary to the expectations that the expertise of the audit committee would min-
imize credit, the results indicate positive relation. The existence of quality audit
committee does not guarantee effective risk reduction. Sun and Liu [41] caution
that when members of the audit committee are too busy, the level of total and
idiosyncratic risks is higher. Perhaps, members of the audit committee have a lot on
their hands to deal with thereby making them less efficient in their functioning.
Variables b B (b-B) sqrt (diag(V_b-V_B))
Fixed Random Difference SE
Audit committee expertise 0.0000728 0.0000751 2.25e-06 —
Board policy function 0.0004016 0.0003986 2.93e-06 —
Number of board meetings 0.0018262 0.0017807 0.0000454 —
Non-executive board members 0.0002097 0.0002187 9.04e-06 —
Audit committee independence 4.89e-06 5.24e-06 0.0000101 —
RWA/Total assets 0.0478272 0.0536965 0.0058693 —
Chairman is ex-CEO 0.0074286 0.0072844 0.0001442 —
Board diversity 0.0000737 0.0000732 5.15e-07 —
Capital adequacy ratio-Tier 1 0.000748 0.0006744 0.0000736 —
ROA 0.00425 0.0041675 0.0000825 —
Bank size 0.0120867 0.0122416 0.0001548 0.0013089
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg.
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg.
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic.
chi2(11) = (b  B)’[(V_b  V_B)^(1)](b  B) = 7316.20
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
(V_b  V_B is not positive definite)
Table 3.
Results for Hausman specification test.
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Board policy functions cover the development and implementation of internal
controls, a culture of ethical behavior and compliance. The result shows high sig-
nificant negative relation with credit risk. These conditions create a favorable envi-
ronment for management oversight. Formulation and implementation of board
policies ensure compliance with sound ethical behavior and enforcement of internal
controls creates favorable environment to mitigate bank risks. The number of board
meetings significantly reduces credit risk. It is not enough for board members to
organize meetings but when members regularly attend and participate in board
OLS (1) Fixed effects (2) Random effects (3)
Net loans to total
loans
Net loans to total
loans
Net loans to total
loans
Audit committee expertise 0.000 0.000* 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Board policy function 0.000 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of board meetings 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Non-executive board members 0.001*** 0.000** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Audit committee independence 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Risk weighted assets to total
assets
0.418*** 0.048*** 0.054***
(0.052) (0.017) (0.017)
Chairman is ex-CEO 0.039** 0.007** 0.007**
(0.017) (0.003) (0.003)
Board diversity 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capital adequacy ratio-Tier 1 0.005** 0.001** 0.001*
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA 0.004 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
Bank size 0.031*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
Obs. 368 368 368
R2 within 0.408 0.408
R2 between 0.015 0.021
R2 overall 0.258 0.025 0.032
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.
Table 4.
Results for OLS, fixed and random effect models.
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activities. Regular board meetings improve the information and communication
prowess of institutions which earns reputational capital [21, 22]. The result
amplifies the institutional theory that normative elements and implementation of
policies of acceptable behavior through compliance make institutions better
governed. The development and implementation of board policies and engagement
in board activities among sampled banks help reduce credit risk. Policies which
ensure active participation of board activities, practicing a culture of ethical behav-
ior and enforcement of internal control systems helps minimize bank losses. In this
chapter, we find that board policies and board meetings have significant inverse
relation with credit risk. Since two of the three variables adequately meet the
expectation of the chapter, we maintain the acceptance of the hypothesis that board
activities and functions minimize bank credit risk.
The results sustain the hypothesis that independent board structure reduces
credit risk, whereas boards with weak independence increase credit risk. The vari-
ables for board structure for example non-executive board members show signifi-
cant negative relation with credit risk. Non-executive board members have greater
independence which makes them effective in their monitoring role. The inverse
relation between non-executive board members and credit risk indicates effective
control and prevention of actions that can trigger high credit risk. The result con-
firms the agency theory that non-executive board members help minimize the
conflict of interest likely to exist. The positive relation between chair being ex-CEO
and credit risk is not unexpected. Usually, such board members are influential and
might exert superior powers which might increase bank credit risk. There is the
tendency for over-confidence and unnecessarily entrenched leading to high credit
risk. The result is consistent with Fernando et al. [25] who hold the opinion that
dual board chair and CEO undermines board effectiveness in dealing with risks and
monitoring managerialism. The BCBS internal control framework advocates for
segregation of duties to ensure efficiency. It is not surprising the result shows
positive relation between board chair being ex-CEO and credit risk. Board diver-
sity (the proportion of female board members) shows negative but insignificant
relation with credit risk. Even though not significant, board diversity is inversely
related to credit risk. Having females on the board helps reduce credit risk. A
board structure that compromises on its independence may have difficulty in
effectively protecting and safeguarding the assets of shareholders. This assertion
confirms earlier research by Karkowska and Acedański [9] that independent
board structure decreases bank risks.
The chapter supports the hypothesis that higher risk weighted density increases
bank credit risk. Board monitoring reduces credit risk of sampled banks. On the use
of risk control mechanisms, risk-weighted assets to total assets shows significant
positive relation with credit risk and therefore confirmatory to literature [20]. The
mean RWA to total assets is almost 50% which is an indication of management
investing in high risk investments. It is therefore not surprising that banks experi-
enced high credit risk during the period under study. Relating the result to the
control variable on bank profitability, the risk-return theory is confirmed. Banks
engage in risky assets and this could explain why profitability (ROA) shows signif-
icant positive relation with credit risk. The European Union has experienced high
non-performing loans (NPLs) during and after the global financial crisis, a situation
which worsens banks credit portfolio performance. Bank control activities need to
be intensified to check managerial recklessness in generating NPLs and subsequent
credit risk which might lead to financial crisis.
The result for board monitoring shows that, audit committee independence
reduces credit risk but not significantly. The hypothesis that board monitoring
reduces bank credit risk is accepted in spite of the fact that in the case of the
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sampled banks, the result is not significant. Even though there is 75% score of audit
committee independence among sampled banks, there is no evidence of significant
relation with credit risk. It is good if variables show significant relation with out-
come variables but when the direction of association is consistent with researcher’s
expectation, it is still worth reporting. The result cast doubts on the monitoring
functions of the board and need to be given much attention than previously. The
audit committee has consistently shown ineptitude in significantly minimizing
credit risk among the sampled banks. From earlier result, the expertise of the audit
committee could not significantly minimize credit risk and same has been reported
on audit committee independence.
The results of the control variables meet the expectations of the authors. Bank
profitability shows significant positive relation with credit risk. This means that the
ambitious pursuit of profitability may lead to high credit risk and this is contradic-
tory to earlier studies [5, 39]. The positive relation of bank profitability with credit
is not surprising because of presence of board chair being ex-CEOs. There is the
tendency for over-confidence and heavy reliance of experience to the neglect of
strictly enforcing internal control mechanisms. The results from Table 4 show that
bank size significantly increases credit risk. Contrary to [5] who find no significant
relation between bank size and credit risk, our study report significant positive
relation with credit risk. For the purpose of catering for country-wide controls from
external bodies such as regulators, the model introduces capital adequacy ratio-tier
1 into the equation. The results show significant negative relation with credit risk,
thus confirming the effectiveness of regulatory controls to ensure bank compliance
and discipline. Perhaps, banks have learnt lessons from the financial crisis. The
result reinforces the institutional and agency theories used as the theoretical under-
pinnings of this study.
Beside the Basel II framework which uses the Supervisory Review and Evalua-
tion Process (SREP) to enforce capital requirements as risk management tool, banks
are encouraged to develop and monitor other risk management techniques [42].
The use of the BCBS internal control framework through the governance systems
complements the capital requirement models of bank risk management. The
framework addresses issues of compliance, reporting and efficiency. The inclusion
of capital adequacy ratio (also as a compliance mechanism) as proxy for regulatory
control makes the chapter’s conceptual model efficient in addressing credit risk in
European banking. The results show that sampled banks invest in risky assets, have
desire for profitability and therefore the board needs to intensify internal control
measures in order to minimize credit losses.
5. Conclusion
The study sought to analyses how board functions and activities, board structure
and monitoring affect credit risk in European banking. Based on the BCBS internal
control framework, we model the 13 principles of the BCBS framework under three
headings namely board functions and activities, board structure and board moni-
toring. The results show that integrated internal control frameworks are comple-
mentary and proven to effectively mitigate bank credit risks. The study concludes
that developing and implementing board policies on supervision, risk control cul-
ture, compliance and enforcement of internal controls minimizes credit risk in
European banking. A board structure that ensures independence, diverse and board
chair not being ex-CEO may reduce bank losses through credit risk. Board moni-
toring is effective when regulatory controls are used to complement existing inter-
nal control mechanisms. From the results, board policies, board activities, non-
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executive boards and external regulations significantly reduce credit risk. Whilst
audit committee independence and board diversity reduce credit risk but not sig-
nificantly, audit committee expertise, board chair being ex-CEO, investments in
risky assets, profitability and bank size significantly increase credit risk. The model
for the chapter shows that the principles of the BCBS framework combines with
regulatory compliance requirements to ensure credit risk reduction. The chapter
supports the agency and institutional theories. The BCBS internal control frame-
work provides reliable mechanism for controlling credit risk.
The study has implications for bank practice. Credit risk continues to be a thorny
issue in the banking industry especially within the EU. Our study provides a diver-
sified approach to addressing this market failure. The chapter shows that
complementing regulatory controls with self-governing practices like internal con-
trols reduce bank risks. This research is not devoid of limitations. But for the
availability of data, the study could have substantially covered three periods
(before, during and after the crisis). Despite these limitations, the methodology is
consistent with existing research and all assumptions and diagnostic tests were
statistically confirmed. These limitations cast no doubts about the findings of our
study. The chapter suggests future research to consider internal control practices in
the periods before, during and after the 2007 global financial crisis. It is further
suggested that, various internal control frameworks could be compared to analyze
their effects on other risks such as market, liquidity and operational risks. Future
research could also consider using dynamic models such as system GMM to study
corporate governance and bank risks.
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